Demise of Syria: Turkey’s Backstabbing Against Russia

MAYANK YADAV

Syria, the cradle of ancient civilisations, has always been a contested territory not only in history but also in the present. Today, it is one of the most prominent failed states of this century. Over the decades, Syria has turned into a colosseum where modern gladiators like the USA, Russia, Iran, Israel, and Turkey, along with numerous ethnic factions, vie to dominate the region.

Recently, the 14-year-long conflict culminated in the collapse of the Assad regime, which was backed by the Russia-Iran alliance. AlJolani, the new statesman of Syria, ascended to power with the support of Turkey, Israel, the United States, and its allies, following a prolonged war against Assad’s forces. However, the most striking aspect of this development is Turkey’s betrayal of Russia. This raises critical questions: Why did Turkey backstab Russia? What role has Turkey played in Syria?

Turkey played a pivotal role in toppling the Assad regime. It provided military training to rebel forces such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with logistical support facilitated by the United States via Libya. This earned Turkey significant influence in shaping the new Syrian regime. Today, it is widely recognized that “all roads to the new Syria pass through Ankara.” Turkey has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of Assad’s downfall, supporting the rebels who seized power. However, its actions have not pleased everyone especially Russia, which feels most betrayed by Turkey’s unexpected move. Russia had placed significant trust in Turkey, particularly in the context of the Syrian conflict, only to face a stark reversal.

Turkey’s actions in Syria are deeply rooted in its strategic interests. First, the Kurdish issue has historically been contentious for Turkey. The Kurds seek to carve out southeastern Turkish territories to form an independent Kurdish state. Under Assad, Syrian Kurds were supported, which posed a significant security threat to Turkey. By dismantling Assad’s regime, Turkey aims to weaken Kurdish aspirations. Second, President Erdoğan faces mounting domestic challenges, including ballooning inflation and economic instability. By invoking the idea of reviving the Ottoman Empire’s legacy, Erdoğan seeks to distract citizens from these issues. Finally, hosting over 3 million Syrian refugees has strained Turkey’s economy. Supporting a Syrian government under its influence could help Turkey repatriate refugees, alleviating its economic burden.

The act of betrayal:

Turkey and Russia have navigated a relationship marked by both conflict and cooperation. Initially adversarial in Syria’s civil war, tensions peaked in 2015 when Turkey downed a Russian warplane, leading to Russian economic sanctions. However, relations improved after Turkish President Erdoğan apologized, and Russian President Putin supported him during a 2016 coup attempt. Despite backing opposing sides in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, the two nations collaborated on ceasefire deals and expanded economic ties. Key initiatives include the TurkStream pipeline and Russia’s construction of Turkey’s first nuclear plant, reflecting pragmatic engagement despite geopolitical rivalry.

The recent event caused more psychological and strategic damage to Russia as it faced betrayal from Turkey, which it had considered a trusted partner in the Syrian issue. The bedrock of this trust was established in the Astana peace accord of 2017. The Astana Process, spearheaded by Iran, Russia, and Turkey, aimed to de-escalate the Syrian conflict through designated zones under their protection, emphasizing that there was “no military solution” and upholding Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite challenges since 2017, the three nations remained committed to its principles. However, Turkey’s recent unilateral actions in Syria, seemingly violating Astana commitments, have likely angered Moscow and Tehran, both deeply invested in securing their interests and supporting Assad’s regime. These moves could strain Turkey’s relations with Russia.

Russia has been subjected to duplicity and deception throughout its history. From the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, which promised non-aggression but was later violated, to Hungary’s betrayal during the Cold War, Russia has faced betrayals consistently. In each case, Russia responded strongly to those who betrayed it. Turkey and Russia share a complex and diverse relationship in the current century, where the former is a NATO member but has purchased Russian S-400 defense systems, straining its relations with NATO allies and raising security concerns within the alliance. Economically, Russia is a significant energy supplier to Turkey, providing over 50% of its natural gas. During the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey mediated with Russia on the Black Sea Grain Initiative. However, the sudden breach of trust by Turkey, which undermined the Astana accords, deeply hurt Russia.

In diplomacy, not every situation requires immediate action or reaction; sometimes, strategic silence must be adopted. Although Russia can retaliate against Turkey if it chooses to, there are numerous sensitive points that could hurt Turkey’s interests more. For example, Russia could provide direct or indirect support to Kurdish forces in Syria, disrupt energy supplies as Turkey imports a significant portion of its natural gas from Russia via the TurkStream pipeline, or block Turkey’s entry into BRICS and the SCO.

However, strategic restraint could be a more fruitful approach than retaliation. Russia understands that Turkey now holds significant influence over the new Syrian regime. Moreover, Turkey is a NATO member that maintains deeper ties with Russia, even in the defense sphere. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war leaves Russia with limited options to act against Turkey. Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, the relationship between Turkey and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.

Thus, the fall of the Assad regime acts as a zero-sum game where some parties benefited, and others suffered losses. It created an opportunity for Israel to expand its influence in the region and annex Syrian territories. For the United States, it marked a strategic victory in evicting Russia from Syria. For Turkey, it established a Turkish-controlled government that could help Ankara counter Kurdish forces. However, for Russia, it lost its puppet government in Syria, raising concerns about its military presence in Tartus. In Iran’s case, it lost a critical passage to send logistics to Hezbollah against Israel in Lebanon via Syria.In conclusion, Turkey’s actions have reshaped the Syrian conflict, benefitting some players while hurting others. As Syria transitions into a new era, the region remains a volatile arena of competing interests and fragile alliances.